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Meghan	Woods	June	15,	2018	LBRL	499	Thesis	Final	Draft		 When	Church	and	State	Collide	Most	people	in	the	United	States	will	be	familiar	with	the	phrase	“separation	of	church	and	state.”1	It	is	seen	by	many	as	something	that	sets	the	U.S.	apart	from	other	countries,	as	the	embodiment	of	our	identity	as	a	secular	society.	But	in	reality,	that	phrase	does	not	even	come	close	to	capturing	the	complexity	of	the	relationship	between	government	and	religion	in	the	modern	United	States.	Rather	than	there	being	a	wall	separating	these	two	entities,	they	in	fact	interact	in	a	number	of	different	ways,	and	one	of	these	ways	comes	in	the	form	of	religious	exemptions.	There	are	many	different	kinds	of	religious	exemptions,	from	those	allowing	inmates	to	receive	special	food	in	prison,	to	those	that	allow	individuals	to	consume	substances	that	are	banned	for	the	general	population,	but	one	that	has	grown	increasingly	controversial	in	recent	years	is	religious	exemption	from	vaccination.	This	paper	will	discuss	the	history	of	and	controversy	surrounding	vaccination	exemptions	in	order	to	examine	some	of	the	issues	involved	in	trying	to	craft	a	fair	and	practical	exemption	process.	Though	it	is	necessary	to	discuss	the	broader	history	of	religious	exemption	law	in	order	to	understand	certain	aspects	of	this	case	study,	this	paper	does	not	claim	that	the	conclusions	drawn	about	vaccination	exemptions	will	
																																																								1	Philip	Hamburger,	Separation	of	Church	and	State	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2009),	1.	This	phrase	was	said	by	Thomas	Jefferson	in	reference	to	the	First	Amendment	of	the	United	States	Constitution,	in	a	letter	he	wrote	to	the	Danbury	Baptist	Association	in	1802.	These	words	do	not	actually	appear	in	the	Constitution	itself,	but	have	come	to	be	used	by	a	vast	number	of	Americans	as	a	way	to	refer	to	their	religious	freedom.	
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necessarily	apply	to	all	forms	of	exemptions.	In	fact,	the	focus	on	vaccinations	is	meant	to	highlight	the	differences	between	different	kinds	of	exemption,	and	to	show	that	vaccinations	involve	their	own	unique	set	of	considerations.	Specifically,	I	will	be	focusing	on	the	following	questions	as	they	relate	to	vaccination	exemptions:	How	do	courts	go	about	determining	what	counts	as	“religion”	in	a	legal	context?	How	do	courts	determine	whether	an	individual	is	sincere	in	their	claims?	And	can	they	do	either	of	things	in	a	way	that	is	both	fair	and	consistent?	This	essay	will	begin	with	a	brief	history	of	the	controversy	surrounding	religious	exemption	law,	after	which	I	will	lay	out	a	framework	for	thinking	about	different	kinds	of	exemption.	I	will	also	give	a	brief	history	of	vaccination	exemptions	more	specifically,	and	discuss	how	they	fit	into	the	framework	presented.	I	will	then	go	on	to	discuss	some	of	the	ways	courts	have	attempted	to	define	religion	and	the	ways	that	they	have	attempted	to	determine	sincerity,	as	well	as	the	problems	involved	in	each	of	these	endeavors.	Much	time	will	be	spent	analyzing	various	court	cases	dealing	with	these	issues,	but	scholars	of	religion	will	also	be	brought	into	the	discussion	in	order	to	provide	insight	into	how	to	think	about	religious	beliefs	and	practices.	The	goal	of	this	essay	is,	above	all,	to	shed	light	on	the	complexity	of	religious	exemption	law,	and	to	engage	with	questions	that	the	courts	have	not	sufficiently	addressed.						
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Section	I:	A	History	of	Religious	Exemptions		 Religious	exemption	law	in	the	United	States	has	had	a	somewhat	turbulent	history	over	the	years.2	Though	the	complicated	dynamic	between	religion	and	law	traces	back	to	the	founding	of	the	country	itself,	a	helpful	place	to	start	when	trying	to	understand	the	debate	over	religious	exemptions	is	the	1963	case	of	Sherbert	v	Verner.	There	had	been	cases	dealing	with	religious	exemption	long	before	Sherbert,	but	it	is	here	that	the	Court	established	the	“no	hindrance”	principle	that	would	come	to	be	the	center	of	much	controversy	at	the	end	of	the	century	and	up	to	the	present.3	The	case	involved	a	woman	named	Adell	Sherbert	from	South	Carolina,	who	was	denied	unemployment	benefits	when	she	quit	her	job	because	it	forced	her	to	work	on	Saturdays,	which,	as	a	Seventh-Day	Adventist,	was	her	Sabbath.	The	position	of	the	state	was	that	she	lacked	“good	cause”	for	turning	down	available	work,	because	if	she	had	been	willing	to	work	on	Saturdays	she	would	have	been	able	to	keep	her	job.4	South	Carolina	law,	however,	forbid	employers	from	terminating	workers	who	refused	to	work	on	Sundays,	and	it	was	in	part	this	blatant	discrimination	that	resulted	in	the	Court	ruling	in	favor	of	Sherbert.	Justice	Brennan,	who	wrote	the	opinion	of	the	Court,	went	even	further	in	considering	the	constitutional	question	of	the	case,	asking	whether	any	“compelling	state	interest	…	justifies	the	substantial	infringement	of	[Sherbert’s]	First	Amendment	right.”5	
																																																								2	John	F.	Wilson,	“The	Founding	Era	(1774-1797)	and	the	Constitutional	Provision	for	Religion,”	Church	and	
State	in	the	United	States.	Wilson’s	article	goes	into	further	detail	about	the	creation	of	the	religion	clauses	in	the	United	States	Constitution	and	provides	further	context	for	the	relationship	between	religion	and	law	in	the	U.S.	3	Christopher	L.	Eisgruber	and	Lawrence	G.	Sager,	Religious	Freedom	and	the	Constitution	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2007),	39-40.	4	Ibid.,	40.	5	Ibid.,	40.	
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	 Though	the	exact	meaning	of	Justice	Brennan’s	opinion	was	somewhat	ambiguous,	later	courts	would	go	on	to	interpret	it	as	meaning	that	whenever	religious	exercise	was	substantially	burdened	by	the	government,	it	would	be	subject	to	the	compelling	state	interest	test,	regardless	of	whether	this	burden	was	specifically	discriminatory	in	nature;	in	essence,	it	was	an	extreme	version	of	the	idea	that	government	should	not	hinder	religious	practice,	and	if	it	did	so	it	would	have	to	prove	that	it	had	a	compelling	reason.6	Considering	the	vast	religious	diversity	in	the	United	States,	it	is	conceivable	that	nearly	any	law	could	be	considered	a	burden	to	someone’s	religious	exercise,	and	what	inevitably	resulted	from	this	decision	was	a	principle	that	was	extremely	impractical,	leading	to	confused	and	inconsistent	application	throughout	the	decades	that	followed.7	In	1990,	the	Supreme	Court	finally	reevaluated	the	merits	of	the	compelling	state	interest	test	in	Employment	Division	v	Smith,	and	in	doing	so	they	ignited	a	controversy	the	ramifications	of	which	are	still	being	felt	today.	Al	Smith	was	an	employee	of	the	State	of	Oregon	who	lost	his	job	after	ingesting	peyote	(a	banned	substance	in	Oregon)	as	part	of	a	ritual	for	the	Native	American	Church,	and	was	denied	unemployment	benefits	because	he	was	fired	for	criminal	misconduct.8	Smith	claimed	that	this	was	a	violation	of	his	free	exercise	of	religion,	but	when	the	case	finally	reached	the	Supreme	Court,	the	justices	disagreed.9	They	held	that	the	compelling	state	interest	test	should	not	be	applied	to	laws	that	are	“neutral	and	generally	applicable.”	When	a	generally	applicable	law	incidentally	burdens	religious	practice	in	some	way,	they	asserted,	it	should	not	automatically	be	
																																																								6	Ibid.,	41.	7	Ibid.,	41-42.	8	Ibid.,	78.	9	Ibid.,	78.	
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considered	unconstitutional.10	This	was	essentially	the	court	attempting	to	reframe	the	discussion;	rather	than	attempting	to	address	every	single	law	that	could	burden	religious	belief	in	some	way,	they	instead	wanted	to	shift	the	focus	to	laws	or	policies	that	singled	out	religious	belief	or	practice	in	a	discriminatory	way.	The	public	outcry	that	followed	this	decision	was	extreme,	with	some	individuals	in	the	media	claiming	that	the	decision	in	Smith	had	marked	the	end	of	religious	freedom	in	the	United	States.	Christopher	Eisgruber,	current	president	of	Princeton	University,	and	Lawrence	Sager,	former	dean	of	the	University	of	Texas	School	of	Law,	argue	that	these	claims	were	in	fact	ridiculous;	the	courts	did	not	stop	protecting	the	free	exercise	of	religion,	they	simply	shifted	their	evaluations	to	the	question	of	whether	laws	were	“neutral	and	generally	applicable”;	in	other	words,	did	these	laws	refrain	from	singling	out	specific	religious	groups	or	practices	for	discrimination?	They	point	out	that	just	three	years	after	Smith,	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	it	was	unconstitutional	for	Hialeah,	Florida	to	ban	Santerians	from	sacrificing	chickens	while	still	allowing	other	nonreligious	animal	slaughter	within	the	city	limits,	and	the	Court	reached	this	decision	on	the	basis	of	this	new	standard.11	Despite	the	irrationality	surrounding	much	of	the	public	concern	over	Smith,	Congress	responded	to	it	with	the	Religious	Freedom	Restoration	Act	(RFRA)	in	1993,	which	stated	that	“no	government	policy	–	local,	state,	or	federal	–	could	‘substantially	burden’	religious	exercise	unless	the	imposition	of	the	burden	was	‘the	least	restrictive	means’	to	further	a	compelling	state	interest.”12	The	Supreme	Court	quite	quickly	held	that	it	was	unconstitutional	to	impose	RFRA	on	state	and	local	governments,	but	that	did	not	
																																																								10	Ibid.,	45.	11	Ibid.,	45.	12	Ibid.,	46.	
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stop	individual	states	from	implementing	their	own	versions	of	RFRA,	nor	did	it	stop	Congress	from	passing	the	Religious	Land	Use	and	Institutionalized	Persons	Act	(RLUIPA),	which	brought	back	the	compelling	state	interest	test	at	the	state	and	local	level	for	anything	having	to	do	with	prison	inmates	or	land	use.13	Unsurprisingly,	this	resurrection	of	the	compelling	state	interest	test	was	no	more	successful	than	it	was	after	Sherbert,	as	Congress	did	nothing	to	address	the	issues	of	application	that	had	existed	before	Smith;	what	resulted	was	simply	more	confusion	that	the	courts	would	have	to	figure	out	themselves.14	In	the	wake	of	this	legislative	chaos,	much	is	still	up	in	the	air;	there	is	still	debate	among	scholars	and	legal	professionals	about	who	should	be	eligible	for	religious	exemptions,	and	even	whether	these	exemptions	should	exist	at	all;	it	often	comes	down	to	the	question	of	whether	the	benefits	of	religious	exemptions	outweigh	the	cost	of	their	application.	In	trying	to	approach	this	subject	that	has	become	so	confusing,	and	the	debate	around	it	which	has	become	so	heated	and	politically	charged,	Kent	Greenawalt,	a	prominent	scholar	of	both	religion	and	law	and	author	of	several	books	on	these	topics,	offers	a	helpful	framework	for	understanding	the	different	kinds	of	religious	exemption,	and	the	different	ways	that	each	should	be	dealt	with.	Greenawalt	sets	himself	apart	from	those	who	would	claim	that	resolving	the	issue	of	exemptions	is	simple	by	shedding	light	on	the	complexity	of	the	issue.	Rather	than	attempting	to	give	a	single	answer	to	the	question	of	whether	religious	exemptions	to	neutral	and	generally	applicable	laws	should	exist	or	not,	he	analyzes	a	number	of	different	
																																																								13	Ibid.,	47.	14	Ibid.,	46.	
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kinds	of	exemption	to	show	how	each	has	a	different	history	and	requires	a	different	approach.15	Greenawalt	lays	out	what	he	sees	as	three	distinct	categories	of	exemption,	organizing	them	in	terms	of	what	effect	the	exemption	has	on	others.	The	first	of	the	categories	he	introduces	is	exemptions	that	do	not	cause	others	direct	harm.	An	example	of	this	kind	of	exemption	would	be	allowing	members	of	the	Native	American	Church	to	consume	peyote	in	their	religious	rituals.16	The	second	category	is	exemptions	that	do	have	the	potential	to	practically	harm	others,	and	Greenawalt	gives	the	example	of	religious	groups	being	allowed	to	violate	zoning	laws,	which	could	negatively	impact	their	neighbors.17	The	third	category	involves	those	seeking	an	exemption	so	that	they	can	treat	certain	people	less	favorably	than	others,	such	as	businesses	seeking	to	refuse	service	to	gay	couples	or	individuals.18	The	effects	that	exemptions	can	have	on	others,	Greenawalt	asserts,	“can	be	absolutely	central	to	whether	any	exemption	is	warranted	and,	if	it	is,	how	far	is	should	extend.”19	These	three	categories	are	simply	his	own	way	of	organizing	exemptions	for	the	purpose	of	his	book,	and	there	are	certainly	other	ways	that	one	could	go	about	categorizing	them;	for	example,	they	could	be	grouped	into	categories	based	on	subject	matter,	such	as	all	medical	exemptions	in	one	category	and	all	exemptions	involving	business	regulations	in	another.	However,	these	categories	do	highlight	the	necessity	to	evaluate	different	kinds	of	exemption	individually.	And	for	those	exemptions	that	could	
																																																								15	Kent	Greenawalt,	Exemptions:	Necessary,	Justified,	or	Misguided?	(Cambridge	and	London:	Harvard	University	Press,	2016),	2-5.	16	Ibid.,	5.	17	Ibid.,	5.	18	Ibid.,	6.	19	Ibid.,	5.	
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cause	harm	to	others,	determining	whether	they	should	be	granted	requires	weighing	the	risks	and	benefits	involved.		 Section	II:	A	History	of	Vaccination	Exemptions		 A	particularly	relevant	example	of	an	exemption	that	could	cause	harm	is	the	exemption	from	mandatory	vaccination.	And,	like	religious	exemption	law	more	generally,	vaccination	exemptions	and	the	controversy	surrounding	them	have	their	own	turbulent	history.	Many	of	the	public	concerns	and	legal	precedent	around	vaccinations	today	have	roots	in	the	previous	centuries,	and	so	it	is	necessary	to	look	to	the	past	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	present.		Very	often,	the	debate	around	vaccination	exemptions	focuses	on	the	tension	between	individual	rights	to	bodily	autonomy	and	the	right	of	the	state	to	impose	measures	to	safeguard	public	health.	Though	the	vaccination	of	an	individual	person	can	protect	that	individual	from	contracting	the	specific	disease	in	question,	the	larger	goal	of	vaccinations	is	something	called	herd	immunity.	Herd	immunity	occurs	“when	a	critical	portion	of	a	community	is	immunized	against	a	contagious	disease	[and]	the	virus	can	no	longer	circulate	in	the	population,	so	that	the	disease	cannot	gain	a	foothold	in	that	society.”20	Since	the	invention	of	vaccines,	diseases	like	smallpox,	polio,	measles,	mumps,	rubella,	and	whooping	cough	have	been	dramatically	reduced	or	entirely	eliminated	by	large-scale	vaccination	programs	that	have	created	and	maintained	herd	immunity.21	Herd	immunity	is	especially	important	because	it	protects	people	in	a	population	who	are	unable	to	be	
																																																								20	Roland	Pierik,	“On	Religious	and	Secular	Exemptions:	A	Case	Study	of	Childhood	Vaccination	Waivers.”	
Ethnicities	17,	no.	2	(2017),	221.	21	Ibid.,	221.	
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safely	vaccinated.	This	includes	children	not	yet	old	enough	to	be	vaccinated,	individuals	who	have	compromised	immune	systems,	and	people	who	have	a	high	probability	of	suffering	form	an	allergic	reaction	to	a	vaccination.	When	a	person	chooses	not	to	be	vaccinated,	or	to	not	vaccinate	their	children,	that	choice	puts	at	risk	the	people	around	them	to	whom	they	could	pass	the	disease	on	if	they	were	infected.22	Maintaining	herd	immunity	does	not	mean	that	every	single	person	in	a	community	needs	to	be	vaccinated,	though	the	specific	percent	varies	depending	on	the	disease	in	question.	Measles,	for	example,	requires	that	between	92-94%	of	the	population	be	immunized.23	But	this	does	mean	that	the	vast	majority	of	people	do	have	to	receive	vaccinations	in	order	for	the	population	to	be	protected	from	outbreaks.		 From	the	time	vaccines	were	first	introduced,	however,	there	was	(and	still	is)	a	particularly	strong	resistance	to	the	compulsory	nature	of	vaccinations,	with	many	people	believing	that	the	government	should	not	have	the	right	to	compel	any	individual	health	measure,	regardless	of	its	benefit	to	the	overall	public	health	of	the	community.24	Often,	they	have	claimed	that	that	the	people	as	a	whole	should	be	able	to	make	decisions	about	scientific	policy,	rather	than	it	being	a	government	decision;	they	are	very	much	against	the	“cult	of	the	expert,”	and	have	advocated	instead	for	direct	democracy.25	Despite	the	public	opposition	to	vaccines	that	has	existed	since	the	start	of	the	20th	century,	however,	the	laws	permitting	states	to	impose	compulsory	vaccination	have	remained	relatively	stable.	
																																																								22	Ibid.,	224.	23	Ibid.,	223-224.	24	Robert	D.	Johnston,	“Contemporary	Anti-Vaccination	Movements	in	Historical	Perspective,”	in	The	Politics	
of	Healing:	Histories	of	Alternative	Medicine	in	Twentieth-Century	America,	ed.	Robert	D.	Johnston,	(New	York:	Routledge),	261.	25	Ibid,	261.	
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The	Supreme	Court	case	of	Jacobson	v	Massachusetts	is	perhaps	the	most	important	case	when	discussing	compulsory	vaccination,	with	the	precedent	it	created	still	holding	significant	weight	today.	In	1902	in	Cambridge,	Massachusetts,	the	Cambridge	Board	of	Health	ordered	that	all	the	city’s	residents	over	twenty-one	years	of	age	receive	the	smallpox	vaccination,	due	to	a	smallpox	epidemic	that	had	broken	out	more	than	six	months	prior	in	the	Boston	and	Cambridge	areas.26	Three	Cambridge	citizens,	including	Reverend	Henning	Jacobson	of	the	Swedish	Lutheran	Church,	were	arrested	for	refusing	the	vaccination;	they	were	found	guilty	of	violating	the	ordinance	and	were	ordered	to	pay	a	fine	of	five	dollars	each.27	When	Jacobson	appealed	to	the	Supreme	Judicial	Court	of	Massachusetts,	the	court	upheld	his	original	conviction	on	the	grounds	that	the	Massachusetts	statute	permitting	the	state	to	impose	compulsory	vaccination	was	a	reasonable	use	of	the	state’s	police	powers.28	In	June	of	1903,	Jacobson	filed	an	appeal	to	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court,	and	the	case	was	eventually	argued	in	the	October	term	of	1904.	Jacobson’s	attorney	claimed	that	Massachusetts’s	compulsory	vaccination	violated	his	Fourteenth	Amendment	rights,	which	prohibited	states	from	depriving	a	person	of	life,	liberty,	or	property	without	due	process.29	They	argued	that	because	Jacobson	was	a	healthy	citizen	who	was	not	at	that	time	infected,	the	state	should	not	be	able	to	force	him	to	receive	a	vaccination	simply	because	he	had	the	potential	to	contract	a	contagious	disease;	compulsory	vaccination,	they	asserted,	was	a	violation	of	his	bodily	integrity,	and	it	was	“unreasonable,	arbitrary,	and	oppressive,	and	therefore,	hostile	to	the	inherent	right	of	every	freeman	to	care	for	his	own	body	and	health																																																									26	Lynne	Curry,	The	Human	Body	on	Trial	(Santa	Barbara:	ABC-CLIO,	2002),	51-52.	27	Ibid.,	52.	28	Ibid.,	52.	29	Ibid.,	52.	
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in	such	a	way	as	to	him	seems	best.”30	The	court,	however,	disagreed	with	Jacobson,	and	in	a	seven-to-two	decision	upheld	the	compulsory	vaccination	order	as	a	reasonable	exercise	of	police	powers.	Especially	in	light	of	the	recent	epidemic	of	a	life-threatening	disease,	they	believed	that	it	was	justifiable	to	demand	vaccinations	in	order	to	protect	the	overall	health	of	the	community.31	Thought	the	court	upheld	the	right	of	states	to	impose	compulsory	vaccination,	Lawrence	Gostin,	in	his	article	about	the	Jacobson	case,	points	out	that	this	case	was	also	“the	Court’s	first	systematic	statement	of	the	constitutional	limitations	imposed	on	government.”32	While	it	defended	police	powers,	it	also	emphasized	a	necessity	to	safeguard	liberty.	Justice	Harlan	asserted	that	that	police	powers	can	only	be	exercised	in	instances	where	there	is	a	demonstrable	health	threat,	and	cannot	be	used	arbitrarily.	Furthermore,	the	methods	used	to	combat	a	given	threat	must	have	a	“real	or	substantial	relation”	to	the	goal	of	protecting	public	health,	and	the	burden	imposed	cannot	be	disproportional	to	the	public	health	benefit	that	the	state	is	attempting	to	achieve.	Finally,	Justice	Harlan	also	made	it	clear	that	public	health	measures	cannot	pose	a	health	risk	to	the	subject	involved;	a	person	should	not	be	required	to	receive	a	vaccination	if	that	person	has	a	severe	allergy	to	one	of	the	vaccine	components,	for	example.33	And,	by	and	large,	the	precedent	from	Jacobson	continues	to	be	influential	in	the	discussion	surrounding	compulsory	vaccination	and	the	boundaries	of	police	powers.34	
																																																								30	Ibid.,	52-53.	31	Ibid.,	53-54.	32	Lawrence	Gostin,	“	Jacobson	v	Massachusetts	at	100	Years:	Police	Power	and	Civil	Liberties	in	Tension,”	
American	Journal	of	Public	Health	95,	no.	4	(2005),	579.	33	Ibid.,	579.	34	Ibid.,	580.	
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Today,	courts	continue	to	consistently	recognize	the	rights	of	states	to	compel	vaccination,	and	they	also	recognize	that	states	are	not	required	to	provide	either	religious	or	philosophical	exemptions,	though	it	is	worth	noting	that	nearly	all	states	do	provide	at	least	religious	exemptions	of	some	sort,	and	many	provide	philosophical	exemptions	as	well.35	New	York	Public	Health	Law,	for	example,	requires	that	all	students	enrolled	in	New	York	public	schools	submit	proof	of	immunization,	unless	a	licensed	physician	certifies	that	the	vaccination	would	be	detrimental	to	the	health	and	wellbeing	of	the	child,	or	if	vaccination	is	against	the	“genuine	and	sincere	religious	beliefs”	of	the	parent	or	guardian.36	However,	a	state	regulation	also	allows	public	schools	to	exclude	from	attendance	those	students	who	have	received	exemptions	from	vaccination	in	the	event	of	an	outbreak	of	a	vaccine-preventable	disease.37	In	January	of	2015,	several	parents	of	children	enrolled	in	a	New	York	public	school	challenged	the	constitutionality	of	the	vaccine	requirements	in	the	New	York	Public	Health	Law.38	The	plaintiffs,	who	were	Catholic,	received	religious	exemptions	for	their	children,	who	were	then	excluded	from	school	when	one	of	their	fellow	classmates	was	diagnosed	with	chickenpox.39	In	their	lawsuit,	the	plaintiffs	argued	that	the	exclusion	of	their	children	from	school	violated	their	free	exercise	of	religion	as	guaranteed	by	the	First	Amendment,	but,	citing	the	earlier	case	Prince	v	Massachusetts,	the	court	held	that	“the	right	to	practice	religion	freely	does	not	include	liberty	to	expose	the	community	or	the	child	to	
																																																								35	Marie	Killmond,	“Why	is	Vaccination	Different?	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	Religious	Exemptions,”	Columbia	
Law	Review	117,	no	4	(2017),	5.	36	N.Y.	Pub.	Health	Law	§	2164(8),	§	2164(9)	37	10	N.Y.C.R.R.	§	66-1.10	38	Phillips	v.	City	of	New	York,	775	F.3d	538,	544	(2d	Cir.	2015)	39	Ibid.	
	 13	
communicable	disease	or	the	latter	to	ill	health	or	death.”40	The	plaintiffs	also	challenged	the	constitutionality	of	the	mandatory	vaccination	law	itself,	arguing	that	it	violated	substantive	due	process.	Referencing	Jacobson,	the	court	concluded	that	the	vaccination	requirement	was	well	within	the	police	powers	of	the	state,	asserting	that	the	case	of	the	plaintiffs	was	no	more	convincing	than	the	one	that	Reverend	Jacobson	had	made	more	than	a	hundred	years	prior.41	Just	over	a	year	later,	in	August	of	2016,	the	courts	yet	again	upheld	the	right	of	states	to	impose	compulsory	vaccination.	In	the	wake	of	a	serious	measles	outbreak	at	Disneyland	in	2015,	California	passed	Senate	Bill	277	and	became	one	of	only	three	states	in	the	U.S.	to	get	rid	of	religious	and	philosophical	exemptions	for	vaccination	requirements	(the	other	two	states	being	Mississippi	and	West	Virginia).42	After	SB	277,	the	only	exemptions	available	were	for	medical	reasons,	children	who	were	homeschooled,	or	students	who	qualified	for	an	individualized	education	program	(IEP).43	In	July	of	2016,	a	group	of	plaintiffs	filed	a	motion	to	prevent	the	state	of	California	from	enforcing	SB	277,	arguing	that	the	removal	of	the	personal	belief	exemption	was	a	violation	of	their	rights	to	free	exercise,	equal	protection,	due	process,	and	education.	In	response,	the	court	referred	to	Jacobson,	stating,	“for	more	than	100	years,	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	has	upheld	the	right	of	the	States	to	enact	and	enforce	laws	requiring	citizens	to	be	vaccinated.”44	In	response,	the	plaintiffs	claimed	that	they	argued	not	against	the	right	of	the	state	to	impose	compulsory	vaccination,	but	specifically	against	the	removal	of	the	personal	belief	
																																																								40	Ibid.	41	Ibid.	42	Killmond,	21.	43	Whitlow	v.	Cal.	Dep't	of	Educ.,	203	F.	Supp.	3d	1079	(S.D.	Cal.	Aug.	26,	2016)	44	Ibid.	
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exemption.	This	reframing	was	unconvincing	to	the	court,	however,	and	they	ultimately	rejected	the	motion	of	the	plaintiffs,	stating	that	nowhere	in	the	Constitution	does	it	require	states	to	provide	either	religious	exemptions	or	personal	belief	exemptions	to	vaccination	requirements.45	The	precedent	established	in	Jacobson	and	enforced	up	to	the	present	day	falls	in	line	with	classic	social	contract	theory	–	first	developed	by	political	philosopher	Jean	Jacques	Rousseau	–	which	asserts	that	by	choosing	to	live	in	a	society,	one	also	agrees	to	give	up	certain	freedoms	for	the	good	of	the	group;	when	living	among	other	people,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	the	choices	one	makes	about	one’s	own	body	can	at	times	harm	others,	and	deciding	not	to	vaccinate	is	one	of	these	potentially	harmful	choices.46	In	light	of	this,	it	becomes	increasingly	difficult	to	justify	the	religious	and	philosophical	vaccination	exemptions	that	most	states	currently	offer,	especially	within	the	context	of	a	growing	anti-vaccination	movement.		 Though	the	anti-vaccination	movement	is	often	looked	at	as	a	fairly	recent	phenomenon,	in	reality	the	opposition	to	vaccination	has	existed	nearly	as	long	as	vaccinations	themselves.47		In	addition	to	those	opposed	to	the	compulsory	nature	of	vaccination,	many	people	are	also	opposed	to	vaccinations	themselves	for	a	variety	of	different	reasons.	One	group	that	people	are	often	most	familiar	with	are	those	who	oppose	vaccination	on	religious	grounds	(typically	Protestant	Christian	groups),	arguing	that	vaccinations	interfere	with	divine	providence.48	There	are	many	other	reasons	that	people	
																																																								45	Ibid.	46	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau,	The	Social	Contract,	trans.	Maurice	Cranston	(London:	Penguin	Books,	1968),	59-65.	47	Johnston,	260.	Johnston’s	article	goes	into	greater	detail	about	the	history	of	vaccination	resistance,	tracing	it	all	the	way	back	to	a	conflict	in	Boston	in	1721	about	smallpox	inoculation.	48	Pierik,	221.	
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have	given	over	the	years	for	opposition	to	vaccinations,	however,	one	of	the	most	prominent	being	a	concern	over	their	safety	or	efficacy.49	Yet	another	fear	was	associated	with	the	use	of	mercury	in	vaccines,	which	was	used	as	a	preservative	in	order	to	combat	the	bacterial	contamination	that	had	so	many	people	justifiably	concerned	over	vaccine	safety.50	More	specifically,	the	preservative	was	called	thimerosal,	an	organomercurial	that	was	50%	ethylmercury,	and	for	the	first	roughly	50	years	of	its	history	its	efficacy	was	sometimes	questioned,	but	rarely	its	safety.51	Mercury,	however,	began	to	be	associated	with	a	series	of	environmental	disasters	involving	the	compound	methylmercury.	Though	these	two	forms	of	mercury	have	similar	sounding	names	and	have	only	a	slight	difference	in	their	physical	structure,	the	chemical	distinction	between	the	two	is	fairly	significant;	it	is	comparable	to	the	difference	between	ethanol	and	methanol,	the	former	being	the	alcohol	in	drinks	like	beer	and	wine,	and	the	latter	being	a	highly	lethal	chemical.52	While	ethylmercury	was	being	use	as	a	vaccine	preservative	with	few	safety	concerns,	methylmercury	was	gaining	a	reputation	as	a	highly	toxic	substance,	which	was	shown	to	cause	extreme	neurological	impairments	in	both	those	people	exposed	directly,	as	well	as	the	children	of	mothers	who	were	exposed.53	As	this	stigma	surrounding	methylmercury	began	to	envelop	all	forms	of	mercury,	the	use	of	thimerosal	in	vaccines	became	the	focus	of	intense	public	scrutiny	that	was																																																									49	Johnston,	261	and	Jeffrey	P.	Baker,	“Mercury,	Vaccines,	and	Autism:	One	Controversy,	Three	Histories,”	
American	Journal	of	Public	Health	98,	no.	2	(2008),,	245.	Despite	the	relative	safety	of	modern	vaccines,	there	was	in	the	early	1900s	a	not	insignificant	risk	associated	with	the	smallpox	vaccine,	for	example,	which	could	cause	fatal	encephalitis	or,	if	contaminated,	spread	syphilis	or	other	infections.	Besides	smallpox,	there	were	other	vaccines	at	the	time	that	could	be	dangerous	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	In	1916,	a	batch	of	typhoid	vaccines	was	tainted	after	being	stored	improperly,	causing	68	severe	reactions,	26	abscesses,	and	4	deaths	in	South	Carolina.	In	Australia	in	1928,	a	contaminated	diphtheria	vaccine	caused	the	death	of	12	children.	This	worry	over	vaccine	safety	at	the	time,	then,	was	not	completely	unfounded.	50	Baker,	245.	51	Ibid.,	245.	52	Ibid.,	246.	53	Ibid.,	246-247.	
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ignited	by	a	group	of	parents	of	autistic	children.54	The	“autism	epidemic”	of	the	1990s	came	about	because	of	the	efforts	of	autism	researchers	to	expand	the	definition	of	the	disorder,	but	the	rise	in	diagnoses	and	lack	of	medical	professionals	with	experience	treating	autism	left	parents	of	autistic	children	quite	frustrated.	This	frustration	with	the	medical	establishment	led	many	of	these	parents	to	search	for	alternative	explanations,	often	with	the	hope	that	they	would	be	able	to	find	a	way	to	cure,	rather	than	simply	manage,	the	disorder.55	It	is	in	this	context	that	a	group	of	these	parents	seized	upon	the	mercury-containing	preservative	thimerosal	as	an	explanation	for	autism.56	Though	the	studies	that	claimed	to	link	vaccinations	with	autism	have	at	this	point	been	thoroughly	discredited	by	the	larger	scientific	community,	the	fear	of	autism	continues	to	contribute	to	the	growing	anti-vaccination	movement,	and	is	one	of	the	more	recent	among	many	reasons	parents	have	for	refusing	to	vaccinate	their	children.57	With	so	many	people	opposed	to	vaccination	for	a	number	of	reasons,	offering	religious	or	philosophical	exemptions	can	be	problematic.	When	maintaining	herd	immunity	requires	that	the	majority	of	people	be	immunized,	allowing	exemptions	has	the	potential	to	make	the	community	vulnerable	to	outbreaks	of	sometimes	deadly	diseases.	With	effective	vaccinations	having	been	widespread	in	the	United	States	for	decades,	it	is	often	easy	to	think	that	the	threat	of	vaccine-preventable	diseases	is	long	gone.	The	2015	measles	outbreak	in	Disneyland,	however,	proves	that	substandard	vaccine	compliance	can	have	devastating	effects.58	Besides	the	Disneyland	outbreak,	over	the	last	decade	there	
																																																								54	Ibid.,	250.	55	Ibid.,	249.	56	Ibid.,	251.	57	Killmond,	4.	58	Pierik,	226.	
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have	been	numerous	outbreaks	of	measles	and	other	contagious	diseases	in	the	United	States:	In	2014	alone	the	CDC	reported	23	separate	measles	outbreaks,	with	the	majority	being	among	unvaccinated	Amish	communities	in	Ohio.59	This	compliance	issue	is	in	part	due	to	extremely	lax	requirements	for	vaccination	exemptions,	with	many	states	allowing	parents	to	exempt	their	children	from	vaccination	requirements	by	simply	checking	a	box	on	a	form.60	Ideally,	nonmedical	vaccine	exemptions	should	be	extremely	limited	and	resistant	to	fraudulent	claims,	so	that	there	are	enough	people	immunized	to	maintain	herd	immunity.	However,	in	order	to	limit	exemptions,	specifically	religious	exemptions,	it	becomes	necessary	to	engage	with	some	questions	that	are	anything	but	easy	to	answer:	How	do	courts	determine	whether	a	claimants	beliefs	are	grounded	in	religion?	How	do	they	determine	if	those	beliefs	are	sincere?	And	is	it	even	possible	to	determine	either	of	these	things	in	a	way	that	is	fair	and	constitutional?		 Section	III:	Defining	Religion	There	are	various	possibilities	when	it	comes	to	placing	limits	on	vaccination	exemptions,	and	all	of	them	come	with	their	own	set	of	problems.	In	trying	to	define	the	eligibility	requirements	for	vaccination	exemptions,	some	of	the	most	important	questions	are	as	follows:	Should	courts	be	allowed	to	limit	exemptions	to	only	certain	religions?	Should	only	religious	exemptions	be	allowed,	or	should	the	system	be	expended	to	allow	for	philosophical	exemptions	as	well?	And	in	discussing	these	options,	how	does	one	go	about	defining	religion	so	as	to	distinguish	it	from	philosophy?																																																									59	“Measles	Cases	and	Outbreaks,”	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention,	https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html.		60	Pierik,	227.	
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For	the	first	of	these	questions,	one	can	look	to	judicial	precedent	for	an	answer.	In	the	Massachusetts	law	code	of	1967,	children	were	required	to	be	fully	immunized	in	order	to	attend	public	schools.	Besides	a	physician	certifying	that	vaccination	would	pose	a	significant	health	risk	to	the	child	in	question,	the	law	gave	only	one	other	possibility	for	exemption:	In	the	absence	of	an	emergency	or	epidemic	of	disease	declared	by	the	department	of	public	health,	no	child	whose	parent	or	guardian	objects	in	writing	to	vaccination	or	immunization	upon	the	ground	that	it	conflicts	with	the	tenets	and	practice	of	a	recognized	church	or	religious	denomination	of	which	he	is	an	adherent	or	member	shall	be	required	to	present	said	physician's	certificate	in	order	to	be	admitted	to	school,	but	may	present,	in	lieu	thereof,	an	affidavit	signed	by	an	official	of	such	church	or	religious	denomination	that	the	parent	or	guardian	of	such	child	is	an	adherent	or	member	in	good	standing	of	such	church	or	religious	denomination,	and	that	such	parent	or	guardian	objects	on	religious	grounds	to	vaccination	and	immunization.61		In	1970,	this	attempt	to	restrict	religious	exemptions	to	members	of	recognized	religious	groups	came	under	scrutiny	in	a	case	heard	by	the	Supreme	Judicial	Court	of	Massachusetts,	Dalli	v.	Board	of	Education.		 Beulah	G.	Dalli	was	unable	to	qualify	for	a	religious	exemption	that	would	allow	her	five	year	old	daughter	to	attend	public	school	without	being	vaccinated	because	she	was	not	a	member	of	a	recognized	religious	denomination.	She	did	not	belong	to	any	particular	church	or	denomination,	and	her	beliefs	about	vaccination	were	grounded	in	her	own	personal	belief	in	the	Bible	and	its	teachings,	specifically	that	an	injection	of	“animal	serum”	would	violate	the	biblical	instruction	to	“keep	the	body	clean	and	acceptable	to	God.”62	She	asserted	in	her	case	that	limiting	exemptions	to	members	of	recognized	denominations	was	a	violation	of	equal	protection	and	free	exercise	of	religion.	The	court	agreed,	and	in	their	
																																																								61	Mass.	Gen.	Laws	ch.	76,	§	15	(1967)		62	Dalli	v.	Board	of	Educ.,	358	Mass.	753,	267	N.E.2d	219	(1971)	
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opinion	asserted	that	the	preferred	treatment	of	certain	religious	beliefs	over	others	was	discriminatory	and	thus	a	violation	of	the	First	and	Fourth	Amendments	of	the	United	States	Constitution.63	In	trying	to	limit	exemptions	to	vaccinations,	then,	it	is	not	possible	to	do	so	in	a	way	that	favors	certain	religious	denominations,	and	so	it	is	necessary	to	expand	the	exemption	to	incorporate	all	forms	of	religious	belief.		 Religious	exemptions	for	vaccination	more	broadly,	however,	come	with	their	own	set	of	concerns,	enough	so	that	three	states	at	this	point	have	refused	to	allow	them,	with	the	most	recent	state	to	get	rid	of	its	religious	exemptions	being	California.64	In	1979,	the	Mississippi	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	the	state’s	religious	exemption	statute	was	unconstitutional,	due	in	large	part	to	what	it	saw	as	a	violation	of	the	equal	protection	rights	of	the	children	who	could	be	exposed	to	the	disease	through	those	who	had	received	the	exemption.	In	their	view,	the	potential	harm	that	can	come	from	allowing	nonmedical	exemptions	from	vaccination	was	great	enough	that	they	felt	it	was	justified	to	eliminate	the	state’s	religious	exemption,	even	when	doing	so	conflicted	with	the	religious	beliefs	of	some	parents	seeking	exemption	for	their	children.65	This	sentiment	is	not	confined	to	the	Mississippi	Supreme	Court,	either;	various	scholars	have	pointed	out	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	concerns	associated	with	religious	vaccination	exemptions.	Because	vaccines	are	not	one	hundred	percent	effective,	even	those	children	who	have	been	immunized	can	be	at	risk	in	the	case	of	an	outbreak,	not	to	mention	those	who	have	not	been	vaccinated	because	of	medical	reasons.66	In	one	Utah	community	that	had	a	high	percentage	of	
																																																								63	Ibid.	64	Killmond,	21.	65	Alicia	Novak,	“The	Religious	and	Philosophical	Exemptions	to	State-Compelled	Vaccination:	Constitutional	and	Other	Challenges,”	Journal	of	Constitutional	Law	7,	no.	4	(2005),	1108.	66	Ibid.,	1116.	
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religious	exemptions,	for	example,	there	was	an	extended	measles	outbreak	due	to	the	absence	of	herd	immunity,	and	a	significant	number	of	those	children	who	were	eventually	infected	had	in	fact	received	vaccinations	for	measles.67	In	a	very	direct	way,	religious	exemptions	can	potentially	violate	the	basic	rights	of	life	and	health	of	others.		 More	closely	related	to	the	religious	aspect	of	religious	exemption,	there	are	those	who	assert	that	allowing	religious	exemptions	poses	an	establishment	clause	problem.	The	establishment	clause	states	that	Congress	“shall	make	no	law	respecting	the	establishment	of	religion,”	and	for	many,	allowing	religious	exemptions	improperly	advances	religion	in	a	way	that	violates	this	clause	because	it	gives	religious	individuals	privileges	that	nonreligious	individuals	cannot	receive.68	The	clause	does	not	go	on	to	describe	in	detail	all	of	the	actions	that	would	count	as	an	establishment	of	religion,	but	rather	leaves	room	for	interpretation;	those	who	are	against	religious	exemptions	argue	that	unfairly	privileging	religion	over	secular	beliefs	is	unconstitutional,	while	those	who	are	in	favor	of	religious	exemptions	argue	that	requiring	parents	to	vaccinate	their	children	even	when	it	goes	against	their	religious	beliefs	violates	their	right	to	free	exercise	of	religion.69	In	the	case	of	vaccinations	specifically,	however,	the	continued	use	of	Jacobson	as	precedent	seems	to	show	that	the	sentiment	in	the	courts	is	that	the	right	to	free	exercise	does	not	necessarily	give	individuals	the	right	to	do	something	that	could	cause	harm	to	others,	and	so	this	claim	loses	some	of	its	weight.	The	ruling	in	Everson	v.	Board	of	Education	also	offers	some	guidance,	with	the	justices	asserting	that	the	establishment	clause	forbids	the	government	from	passing	laws	“which	aid	one	religion,	aid	all	religions,	or	prefer	one	religion	over	
																																																								67	Ibid.,	1116.	68	Ibid.,	1111.	69	Ibid.,	1111.	
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another.”70	Thus	a	very	strong	case	can	be	made	for	religious	exemptions	being	unconstitutional.		 Opening	up	vaccination	exemptions	to	allow	for	philosophical	exemptions,	however,	is	possibly	even	more	problematic,	though	not	for	all	of	the	same	reasons.	On	one	hand,	it	would	mean	an	exemption	system	for	vaccinations	that	could	be	free	from	discrimination	or	establishment	clause	issues,	but	it	would	also	mean	opening	up	exemptions	to	so	many	people	that	it	could	compromise	herd	immunity.	The	levels	of	scrutiny	for	religious	exemptions	vary	from	state	to	state,	with	some	requiring	an	evaluation	of	the	level	of	sincerity	of	the	person	claiming	the	exemption,	and	others	simply	requiring	parents	to	sign	a	form	that	states	that	they	have	an	opposition	to	vaccinations	grounded	in	religious	belief.71	When	it	comes	to	philosophical	exemptions,	the	burden	of	proof	is	even	lower.	Though	each	state	has	its	own	specific	details	and	requirements,	philosophical	exemptions	generally	allow	anyone	to	claim	an	exemption	if	they	have	any	personal,	philosophical,	or	moral	reason	for	objecting	to	vaccinations.72	This	relaxed	system	means	that	there	can	hardly	be	room	for	discrimination,	considering	essentially	anyone	who	wants	an	exemption	can	qualify,	and	there	would	be	no	establishment	clause	issue	because	it	is	open	to	everyone	regardless	of	religious	belief	or	lack	thereof.	From	this	perspective,	it	is	a	perfectly	sound	solution	to	the	exemption	issue.	But	keeping	in	mind	the	risk	that	unvaccinated	individuals	can	pose	to	the	people	around	them,	the	problems	caused	by	philosophical	exemptions	may	be	greater	than	those	that	they	would	eliminate.	The	idea	that	philosophical	exemptions	would	cause	a	significant	rise	in	
																																																								70	Everson	v.	Bd.	Of	Educ.,	330	U.S.	1,	15	(1947).	71	Novak,	1108.	72	Ibid.,	1109.	
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the	number	of	unvaccinated	individuals	is	not	purely	theoretical;	states	that	have	introduced	philosophical	exemptions	have	seen	a	rise	in	the	number	of	parents	claiming	these	exemptions	for	their	children.	Furthermore,	these	states	also	show	that	philosophical	exemptions	make	up	a	larger	percentage	of	all	exemptions	claimed	than	either	religious	or	medical	exemptions.73	Therefore,	many	of	the	problems	that	are	present	with	religious	exemptions	are	magnified	when	philosophical	exemptions	are	introduced.	Allowing	these	exemptions,	then,	clearly	poses	a	risk	to	the	overall	health	of	the	community,	one	that	may	not	threaten	the	right	to	free	exercise	in	the	way	religious	exemptions	do,	but	that	does	in	fact	threaten	the	health	and	safety	of	others	to	a	greater	extent.		Between	these	three	options	–	restricting	exemptions	to	members	of	established	religions,	restricting	exemptions	to	religious	reasoning	more	generally,	or	allowing	philosophical	exemptions	in	addition	to	religious	exemptions	–	religious	exemptions	on	their	own	seem	to	be	the	least	problematic	when	it	comes	to	balancing	rights;	it	would	not	blatantly	privilege	certain	religious	beliefs	over	others,	but	it	would	still	be	limiting	enough	that	it	would	not	compromise	herd	immunity	to	the	extent	that	philosophical	exemptions	would	(though	the	problem	of	exposing	the	community	to	the	risk	of	outbreaks	is	not	entirely	absent).	However,	while	the	establishment	clause	issue	in	this	case	is	relatively	minor	in	comparison	to	restricting	exemptions	to	only	certain	religious	groups,	there	is	a	significant	implementation	problem	when	it	comes	to	allowing	religious	exemptions;	it	requires	courts	to	determine	what	exactly	counts	as	“religion.”	At	first	glance,	defining	religion	may	seem	like	a	simple	task;	every	dictionary	seems	to	do	it	without	much	trouble,	after	all.	But	among	religious	scholars,	there	is	no	single,																																																									73	Ibid.,	1110.	
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universally	agreed	upon	definition	for	religion.	There	are	dozens	of	different	approaches	that	have	been	argued	for	and	against	for	years,	but	something	as	complex	and	nuanced	as	religious	belief	cannot	be	easily	pinned	down	with	a	dictionary-style	definition.	In	order	to	get	a	sense	of	the	complexity	of	religious	beliefs,	it	will	be	helpful	to	examine	a	few	of	the	definitions	and	approaches	that	have	been	presented	over	the	years.	Émile	Durkheim	was	a	prominent	French	sociologist	in	the	late	19th	century,	and	one	of	his	most	important	works,	The	Elementary	Forms	of	Religious	Life,	remains	influential	in	the	field	of	religious	studies.74	In	it,	he	defines	religion	as	“a	unified	system	of	beliefs	and	practices	relative	to	sacred	things,	that	is	to	say,	things	set	apart	and	forbidden	--	beliefs	and	practices	which	unite	into	one	single	moral	community	called	a	Church,	all	those	who	adhere	to	them.”75	In	this	approach,	the	focus	is	on	the	social	aspect	of	religion;	the	beliefs	and	practices	of	religion	are	important	in	the	way	they	bring	together	a	community,	not	because	of	the	specific	individual	impact	that	they	might	have.	William	James,	an	American	psychologist	and	philosopher	writing	around	the	same	time	as	Durkheim,	approached	religion	from	an	entirely	different	angle.76	James	considered	individual	belief,	rather	than	religious	communities,	to	be	the	fundamental	aspect	of	religion,	defining	religion	as	“the	feelings,	acts,	and	experiences	of	individual	men	in	their	solitude,	so	far	as	they	apprehend	themselves	to	stand	in	relation	to	whatever	they	may	consider	the	divine.”77	In	an	academic	context,	it	is	less	pressing	that	there	be	a	single,	fundamental	definition	of	religion;	scholars	can	give	definitions	for	the	purpose	of	specific																																																									74	Henri	M.	Peyre,	Encyclopaedia	Britannica,	“Émile	Durkheim,”	Encyclopædia	Britannica,	inc.,	2018.	75	Robert	Alun	Jones,	Emile	Durkheim:	An	Introduction	to	Four	Major	Works	(Beverly	Hills,	CA:	Sage	Publications,	Inc.,	1986),	62	76	Horace	M.	Kallen,	Encyclopaedia	Britannica,	“William	James,”	Encyclopædia	Britannica,	inc.,	2018.	77	William	James,	The	Varieties	of	Religious	Experience:	A	Study	in	Human	Nature	(Nee	Hyde	Park,	New	York:	University	Books,	1902),	31.	
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discussions,	and	they	can	choose	to	focus	on	targeted	aspects	of	religion	–	such	as	Durkheim’s	emphasis	on	religious	groups	and	James’s	emphasis	on	the	individual	–	without	discounting	other	aspects	of	what	could	be	considered	religious.	The	law,	however,	is	by	necessity	much	more	black	and	white	than	academics,	and	defining	terms	such	as	religion	in	a	definitive	way	is	a	much	more	pressing	concern	because	it	has	a	direct	effect	on	the	treatment	of	individuals	seeking	religious	exemptions.	In	Dalli,	the	Massachusetts	court	ruled	that	the	state	could	not	restrict	religious	exemptions	to	those	who	were	members	of	a	recognized	religious	group,	due	to	justified	concerns	about	discrimination.78	In	the	case	of	a	single	person	seeking	exemption,	though,	one	whose	beliefs	are	not	connected	to	a	religious	group,	how	is	the	court	to	determine	if	their	beliefs	are	indeed	religious	and	not	simply	“philosophical?”	In	the	case	of	Beulah	Dalli,	her	beliefs	were	determined	to	be	religious	because	they	were	based	on	her	own	reading	and	interpretation	of	the	Bible,	but	what	about	someone	whose	beliefs	are	not	drawn	from	a	recognized	holy	book	written	centuries	prior?79	Where	does	the	line	between	religion	and	philosophy	lie,	when	there	is	not	an	established	religious	group	to	look	to?		This	is	not	a	question	that	courts	have	ignored;	they	do	not	simply	accept	that	any	beliefs	are	religious	just	because	an	individual	claims	that	they	are.	In	fact,	on	multiple	occasions,	people	have	been	denied	exemptions	because	the	court	has	questioned	them	about	the	nature	of	their	beliefs	and	determined	that	they	are	not	religious	in	nature.	In	
McCartney	v.	Austin	in	1969,	the	plaintiffs	sought	a	vaccination	exemption	for	their	child,	stating	that	it	was	against	their	religious	beliefs	to	vaccinate.	The	plaintiffs	claimed	to	be	Roman	Catholic,	however,	and	the	court	determined	that	because	the	Catholic	faith	of																																																									78	Dalli	v.	Board	of	Educ.,	358	Mass.	753,	267	N.E.2d	219	(1971)	79	Ibid.	
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which	the	plaintiffs	were	members	did	not	have	any	stated	opposition	to	vaccinations,	their	reasoning	for	seeking	an	exemption	could	not	be	religious	in	nature.80	However,	simply	because	an	individual	disagrees	with	or	differs	from	the	official	doctrine	of	the	religious	organization	they	belong	to,	does	that	mean	that	those	differing	opinions	are	not	religious?	If	an	individual	belonged	to	a	church	that	believed	sex	before	marriage	was	not	sinful,	but	that	individual	felt	based	on	their	own	reasoning	that	it	was	a	sin,	is	this	belief	not	religious	simply	because	it	does	not	conform?	In	a	similar	case	from	a	family	court,	the	plaintiffs,	who	were	members	of	the	Methodist	Church,	also	argued	that	they	should	be	granted	a	vaccination	exemption	for	their	children.	The	court	pointed	out	that	the	Methodist	Church	did	not	have	any	tenets	prohibiting	vaccination,	and	argued	that	the	beliefs	of	the	plaintiffs	were	based	on	their	personal	convictions	as	chiropractors	rather	than	on	their	religious	convictions.81	It	is	evident	that	the	courts	are	willing	to	engage	with	the	question	of	whether	beliefs	are	religious	in	nature;	the	more	pressing	question	is,	are	they	doing	so	consistently	and	fairly?	The	issue	of	defining	religion	grows	even	more	complicated	when	one	considers	lived	religion,	or	“popular	religion”	as	Robert	Orsi	calls	it	in	his	book	The	Madonna	of	115th	
Street.	He	explains	that	lived	religion	consists	of	religious	beliefs	and	practices	as	they	are	experienced	in	everyday	life,	in	contrast	to	the	specific	doctrines	of	organized	religion;	it	is	what	lies	outside	of	religious	institutions	and	the	oversight	of	officials.82	Orsi	also	discusses	the	way	that	popular	religion	has	sometimes	been	viewed	over	the	years,	as	somehow	backwards,	being	dismissed	with	terms	like	“magic”	or	“superstition,”	seen	by	some	as	“the																																																									80	McCartney	v.	Austin,	57	Misc.	2d	(N.	Y.)	525,	affd.	31	App.	Div.	2d	(N.	Y.)	81	Matter	of	Elwell,	55	Misc.	2d	(N.	Y.)	252,	259	82	Robert	A.	Orsi,	The	Madonna	of	115th	Street:	Faith	and	Community	in	Italian	Harlem,	1880	1950	(New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press,	2002),	xxxi-xxxiii.	
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experience	of	dark,	poor,	alien	folk,	of	children	and	women,	of	the	colonized,	enslaved,	and	‘primitive,’	of	the	ignorant	or	uneducated.”	To	some	of	these	critics,	lived	religion	isn’t	even	real	religion	at	all.83	In	her	book	The	Impossibility	of	Religious	Freedom,	Winnifred	Sullivan	shows	what	can	happen	when	the	legal	system	comes	into	contact	with	the	world	of	lived	religion.	Her	book	is	a	case	study	focusing	on	the	case	Warner	v.	Boca	Raton,	in	which	a	group	of	Florida	residents	attempted	to	prevent	a	local	cemetery	from	removing	various	grave	decorations	including	crosses,	statues,	planters,	and	Stars	of	David	that	they	had	placed	over	the	course	of	a	decade	on	the	graves	of	their	loved	ones,	which	were	decorations	that	violated	cemetery	regulations.84	Their	claim	was	made	on	the	basis	of	the	Florida	RFRA,	which	prevented	substantial	burden	of	religious	practice.	The	Florida	RFRA	also	defined	“exercise	of	religion”	as	“an	act	or	refusal	to	act	that	is	substantially	motivated	by	a	religious	belief,	whether	or	not	the	religious	exercise	is	compulsory	or	central	to	a	larger	system	of	religious	belief.”85	Despite	this	broad	definition	of	religion,	the	inquiries	of	both	the	judge	and	the	city’s	lawyer	into	the	religious	lives	of	the	plaintiffs	reflected	a	view	of	religion	that	seems	fairly	similar	to	the	critics	of	lived	religion	that	Orsi	described.		When	questioning	one	of	the	plaintiffs,	the	lawyer,	Bruce	Rogow,	implied	that	her	motivation	for	setting	up	a	perimeter	around	her	brother’s	grave	to	prevent	it	from	being	stepped	on	was	not	religious,	because	her	Catholic	teachings	never	explicitly	required	her	to	do	so;	this	is	despite	the	fact	that	the	reasoning	she	gave	was	based	on	a	personal	
																																																								83	Ibid.,	xxxiv.	84	Winnifred	Sullivan,	The	Impossibility	of	Religious	Freedom	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005),	2.	85	Ibid.,	22-23.	
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understanding	of	events	in	the	Bible,	just	like	the	plaintiff	in	the	Dalli	case.86	For	many	of	the	plaintiffs,	they	felt	that	their	decisions	regarding	the	placement	of	items	on	their	loved	one’s	graves	were	motivated	by	their	own	understanding	of	their	respective	religions,	yet	the	lawyers	in	the	trial	continually	seemed	to	dismiss	their	practices	as	idiosyncratic,	as	simply	personal	choices	that	had	nothing	to	do	with	religion.87	They	also	seemed	to	be	trying	to	show	that	the	plaintiffs	were	not	faithful	practitioners	of	their	religions,	that	they	did	not	attend	church	regularly	enough	or	did	not	consult	with	the	proper	religious	officials;	their	practices	did	not	conform	to	standard	doctrine,	and	therefore	they	were	personal	rather	than	religious.88	Furthermore,	the	judge	very	often	projected	his	own	sensibilities	and	understandings	of	religion	onto	the	plaintiffs,	dismissing	the	explanations	of	both	the	plaintiffs	and	the	religious	experts	at	the	trial	and	allowing	his	personal	beliefs	to	influence	his	assessment.	That	which	did	not	fit	his	understanding	of	religion	was	dismissed	as	merely	personal	preference.89	In	her	commentary	on	the	case,	Sullivan	summed	up	the	nature	of	discourse	fairly	well,	saying,	“the	City	seemed	to	be	saying:	How	can	anyone	seriously	believe	that	this	is	religion	–	that	this	is	religion	powerful	enough	and	important	enough	to	challenge	state	sovereignty?”90		Not	all	lawyers	and	judges	would	have	the	same	attitude	towards	lived	religion	as	those	in	the	Warner	case	did;	Dalli	is,	in	fact,	a	good	example	of	a	court	being	willing	to	accept	the	religious	nature	of	a	belief	that	is	not	grounded	in	the	official	doctrine	of	a	religious	denomination.		But	Warner	does	show	the	issues	that	arise	when	courts	are	asked	
																																																								86	Ibid.,	39.	87	Ibid.,	39-41.	88	Ibid.,	103.	89	Ibid.,	92-94.	90	Ibid.,	109.	
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to	decide	what	practices	count	as	religious.	Sometimes,	the	distinction	can	seem	rather	simple.	Returning	to	the	issue	of	vaccination,	a	person	who	claims	to	be	against	vaccines	because	they	believe	based	on	scientific	reasoning	that	they	are	harmful	is	clearly	not	basing	their	opinion	on	religious	convictions.	Similarly,	a	person	who	belongs	to	a	religion	the	doctrines	of	which	explicitly	condemn	vaccination	seems	very	clearly	to	be	basing	their	opinion	on	their	religion.	But	some	cases,	possibly	the	majority	of	cases,	are	not	so	clear.	Outside	of	the	world	of	religious	institutions,	with	their	officials	and	their	holy	books	and	their	established	doctrine,	religion	is	messy,	and	the	boundaries	between	religion	and	philosophy,	or	between	religion	and	culture,	are	not	always	easy	to	distinguish.	The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	not	to	offer	a	method	for	determining	what	beliefs	are	religious,	but	rather	to	show	how	difficult	it	is	to	do	so	consistently	and	fairly	within	the	context	of	the	legal	system,	a	system	which	is	quite	fond	of	black	and	white	definitions.		 Section	IV:	Determining	Sincerity	Perhaps	even	more	difficult	than	determining	what	counts	as	religious	is	determining	whether	an	individual	is	sincere	in	their	claim;	in	other	words,	does	the	person	claiming	a	religious	exemption	actually	hold	the	beliefs	they	claim	to,	or	are	they	simply	trying	to	obtain	an	exemption	due	to	some	other	reason	that	would	normally	not	qualify?	Not	all	kinds	of	exemption	are	equally	at	risk	for	fraudulent	claims;	as	Greenawalt	points	out,	determining	whether	a	claimant	is	sincere	in	their	stated	reasoning	for	seeking	exemption	can	actually	be	fairly	easy	if	one	can	find	no	secular	advantage	to	obtaining	said	
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exemption.91	The	Amish,	for	example,	have	traditionally	been	granted	an	exemption	that	allows	them	to	take	their	children	out	of	school	at	the	age	of	fourteen,	and	it	is	unlikely	that	an	individual	would	join	the	Amish	simply	to	get	an	exemption	to	take	their	child	out	of	school	at	a	younger	age	than	is	typically	allowed.	When	looking	at	exemptions	allowing	individuals	to	consume	otherwise	prohibited	substances,	however,	there	is	much	less	certainty;	it	is	very	much	conceivable	that	someone	would	attempt	to	join	the	Native	American	Church,	for	example,	in	order	to	qualify	for	an	exemption	that	would	allow	them	to	consume	the	peyote.92	As	discussed	earlier	in	this	essay,	there	are	many	people	who	oppose	vaccination	for	a	number	of	reasons,	many	of	which	are	not	religious	in	nature.	Though	concerns	about	vaccine	safety	have	been	around	for	decades,	such	as	the	fear	that	they	will	cause	autism,	the	Internet	has	made	it	even	easier	for	fears	and	doubts	about	vaccination	to	spread	to	a	wide	audience.	There	are	many	websites	and	blogs	that	are	entirely	dedicated	to	discussing	vaccines,	and	to	spreading	information	about	what	they	consider	to	be	the	dangers	of	vaccinating.	Though	there	are	a	variety	of	different	reasons	that	the	individuals	who	run	these	websites	give	for	their	opposition	to	vaccines,	there	are	some	common	themes	among	them;	more	specifically,	some	of	the	things	that	are	seen	most	often	are	distrust	of	the	government	and	scientists,	issues	with	the	compulsory	nature	of	vaccines,	and	testimonials	from	parents	and	medical	professionals	warning	about	the	dangers	of	vaccination.	
																																																								91	Kent	Greenawalt,	Religion	and	the	Constitution	Volume	1:	Free	Exercise	and	Fairness.	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2006),	122.	92	Ibid.,	121-122	
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The	sentiment	that	parents	are	being	lied	to	about	vaccines	can	be	seen	in	a	variety	of	forms.	A	blog	called	Living	Whole,	for	example,	has	an	entire	article	about	the	various	lies	that	scientists	and	the	government	have	supposedly	been	telling	about	vaccines,	beginning	with	“Dear	Parents,	you	are	being	lied	to.”93	The	author	–	a	naturopath	named	Megan	Redshaw,	who	runs	the	blog	–	asserts	that	it	is	untrue	that	measles	is	a	deadly	disease,	that	diseases	like	chickenpox	and	the	flu	are	not	“a	big	deal,”	that	vaccines	do	not	actually	prevent	whooping	cough,	that	vaccines	did	nothing	to	aid	in	the	eradication	of	diseases	and	in	some	cases	actually	made	certain	diseases	more	prevalent,	and	the	list	goes	on.94	In	the	mission	statement	of	another	website,	Vaccination	News,	the	owner	of	the	site, Sandy	Gottstein,	also	claims	a	concern	for	the	amount	of	false	information	about	the	benefits	of	vaccination,	saying	that	she	is	against	“bad	science”	being	used	to	force	parents	to	vaccinate	their	children.95	This	mission	statement	brings	up	another	of	the	common	themes	found	on	similar	websites,	which	is	the	opposition	to	the	compulsory	nature	of	vaccines,	a	sentiment	that	has	been	present	since	the	very	beginning	of	the	anti	vaccination	movement;	there	is	among	many	anti-vaccination	advocates	a	resentment	that	vaccination	is	required.	The	Vaccination	News	website,	for	example,	asserts	that	parents	should	feel	free	to	vaccinate	their	children	if	they	want	to,	but	that	they	should	be	allowed	to	make	their	own	decision	about	whether	or	not	it	is	right	for	their	child.	They	claim	that	their	goal	is	to	provide	
																																																								93	Megan	Redshaw,	“Dear	parents,	are	you	being	lied	to?”	Living	Whole,	April	2014,	https://www.livingwhole.org/dear-parents-are-you-being-lied-to/.	94	Ibid.	95	Sandy	Gottstein,	“Vaccination	News,”	Vaccination	News,	https://www.vaccinationnews.org.	
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information	from	all	sides	of	the	vaccination	debate	in	order	to	help	parents	make	an	informed	decision.96	In	addition,	perhaps	one	of	the	most	common	tactics	on	these	websites	is	the	list	of	“testimonials”	that	many	include;	while	there	are	various	kinds	of	testimonials	included	on	different	websites,	the	most	common	two	seem	to	be	testimonials	from	individuals	claiming	to	be	medical	professionals	who	agree	with	the	sentiments	of	the	website	in	question,	and	testimonials	from	or	about	individuals	–	typically	children	–	who	have	supposedly	been	harmed	because	of	vaccinations	they	received.	Vaccination	News	has	a	list	of	around	a	dozen	testimonials	supposedly	from	doctors,	professors,	and	parents	expressing	gratitude	to	the	website	for	providing	information,	or	agreeing	with	many	of	the	anti-vaccination	sentiments	that	are	found	in	the	articles	posted	by	the	website.	Many	of	these	testimonials	also	include	the	promise	of	a	monetary	contribution	to	the	website	in	order	to	allow	it	to	continue	its	work,	and	urge	others	to	donate	as	well.97	The	website	Vax	Truth	gives	its	testimonial	page	the	title	“Meet	the	Children,”	and	it	includes	a	few	dozen	stories	about	children	who	were	supposedly	harmed	by	vaccines,	written	by	their	parents.	One	mother	writes	that	vaccination	caused	her	son	to	be	restless,	to	cry	all	the	time	and	never	sleep,	claiming	that	her	doctor	ignored	all	of	her	concerns.98	Another	parent	writes	about	how	her	daughter	was	a	perfectly	normal	child	until	her	first	round	of	vaccinations,	after	which	point	she	was	constantly	sick.99	One	testimonial	even	has	a	mother	claiming	that	her	adult	son	died	after	receiving	the	flu	vaccine,	asserting	that	the	vaccine	must	have	
																																																								96	Ibid.	97	Ibid.	98	“Meet	The	Children,”	VaxTruth,	Vaxtruth.org/meet-the-children/.	99	Ibid.	
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been	the	cause	because	nothing	else	in	his	life	had	been	different	in	the	months	before	his	death.100	Many	of	the	tactics	on	these	websites	instill	fear	that	one’s	child	will	be	harmed,	or	that	the	government	and	the	pharmaceutical	industry	are	lying	to	them	about	the	risks	of	vaccination.	These	websites	are	easy	to	find	and	are	there	for	everyone	to	see,	cloaking	themselves	with	the	air	of	authority,	often	by	presenting	quotes	from	people	they	claim	are	medical	professionals	supporting	their	stances.	And	if	parents	are	made	to	fear	that	their	child	could	be	at	risk	if	they	allow	them	to	be	vaccinated	because	of	the	information	that	they	come	across	online,	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	worry	that	at	least	some	of	them	would	attempt	to	lie	about	their	religious	beliefs	in	order	to	obtain	an	exemption.	In	Robert	Johnston’s	history	of	the	anti-vaccination	movement,	in	fact,	he	says	that	one	vaccine	safety	advocate	has	helped	parents	“formulate	religious	exemptions”	if	they	had	concerns	about	vaccine	safety,	implying	that	the	parents	did	not	in	fact	have	religious	reasons	for	their	concerns.101	Yet	despite	the	obvious	need	to	be	able	to	attempt	to	determine	sincerity	in	cases	of	vaccination	exemption,	it	is	unclear	how	to	do	so,	and	there	are	also	concerns	about	whether	it	is	something	courts	should	even	have	the	right	to	examine.	The	most	important	Supreme	Court	case	dealing	with	the	issue	of	sincerity	is	United	
States	v.	Ballard,	which	directly	addressed	the	question	of	whether	courts	should	be	allowed	to	examine	the	sincerity	of	religious	beliefs.	In	1944,	Guy	W.	Ballard,	Edna	W.	Ballard,	and	Donald	Ballard	were	convicted	for	mail	fraud	through	their	promotion	of	the	I	Am	movement	through	the	mail.	They	solicited	funds	and	memberships	and	sold	literature	promoting	their	movement,	which	claimed,	among	other	things,	that	Guy	W.	Ballard	was	a																																																									100	Ibid.	101	Johnston,	275.	
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divine	messenger,	and	that	the	founders	of	the	movement	were	able	to	cure	any	disease,	even	those	that	were	typically	classified	by	medical	professionals	as	incurable,	and	that	they	had	in	fact	cured	hundreds	of	individuals	in	the	past.102	There	were	two	major	questions	brought	before	the	justices:	whether	the	court	could	inquire	into	the	truth	or	falsity	of	the	claims	themselves,	and	whether	the	court	could	attempt	to	determine	whether	the	beliefs	in	question	were	sincerely	held	by	the	members	of	the	movement.		 Justice	Douglas	delivered	the	opinion	of	the	Court,	and	he	spent	the	majority	of	the	opinion	addressing	the	issue	of	determining	the	truth	or	falsity	of	religious	beliefs;	in	other	words,	the	question	of	whether	the	courts	should	be	allowed	to	try	and	determine	whether	the	religious	beliefs	of	an	individual	were	literally	and	factually	true.	It	was	this,	rather	than	sincerity,	that	struck	him	as	problematic.	The	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	had	previously	held	that	the	questions	of	truth	should	be	submitted	to	the	jury	for	consideration,	likely	because	they	felt	that	a	case	of	mail	fraud	could	not	be	properly	considered	without	determining	whether	the	claims	themselves	were	untrue,	but	Justice	Douglas	asserted	that	doing	so	would	be	a	violation	of	the	freedom	of	religion	guaranteed	by	the	Constitution.	“Heresy	trials	are	foreign	to	our	Constitution,”	he	wrote,	going	on	to	explain,	“Men	may	believe	what	they	cannot	prove.	They	may	not	be	put	to	the	proof	of	their	religious	doctrines	or	beliefs.	Religious	experiences	which	are	as	real	as	life	to	some	may	be	incomprehensible	to	others.”103	In	contrast	to	this	strong	condemnation,	Douglas	says	almost	nothing	of	the	sincerity	question,	simply	agreeing	with	the	statements	of	the	trial	judge	that	it	is	
																																																								102	United	States	v.	Ballard,	322	U.S.	78	(1944)	103	Ibid.	
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permissible	to	question	whether	an	individual	“honestly	and	in	good	faith”	believes	the	things	they	claim	to.104		 While	this	opinion	was	the	majority	and	thus	ultimately	the	ruling	of	the	court,	it	was	by	no	means	unanimous;	Chief	Justice	Stone	was	joined	in	his	dissenting	opinion	by	Justice	Roberts	and	Justice	Frankfurter,	agreeing	with	the	majority	that	courts	should	be	able	to	determine	sincerity,	but	going	even	further	by	asserting	that	the	question	of	truth	should	be	applied	to	certain	religious	claims.105	Though	this	debate	over	how	much	the	courts	should	be	able	to	question	religious	beliefs	is	extremely	important,	for	the	purpose	of	this	essay,	which	is	attempting	to	address	the	question	of	sincerity,	it	is	Justice	Jackson’s	dissenting	opinion	that	is	the	most	relevant,	as	he	is	the	only	Justice	who	discussed	the	question	of	sincerity	in	any	real	detail;	though	his	opinion	was	not	the	majority,	the	points	that	he	raises	are	very	often	endorsed	by	scholars	who	deal	with	the	question	of	adjudicating	sincerity.106		 Jackson	disagreed	with	the	opinions	of	both	Douglas	and	Stone,	making	a	compelling	argument	for	why	the	courts	should	refrain	from	questioning	whether	an	individual’s	religious	beliefs	are	sincerely	held.	One	of	the	important	concerns	he	raised	is	the	way	juries	would	view	an	individual	with	a	faith	that	they	do	not	understand,	or	one	that	is	drastically	different	from	their	own;	if	certain	beliefs	seem	ridiculous	to	a	jury,	they	may	be	less	likely	to	believe	that	the	individual	in	question	could	sincerely	believe	in	them,	and	this	paves	the	way	for	potential	discrimination.107	Jackson’s	other	major	point	involves	the	issue	of	how	one	goes	about	defining	and	determining	sincerity;	namely,	does	sincerity																																																									104	Ibid.	105	Ibid.	106	Nathan	S.	Chapman,	“Adjudicating	Religious	Sincerity,”	Washington	Law	Review	92,	(2017),	1.	107	United	States	v.	Ballard,	322	U.S.	78	(1944)	
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mean	that	a	person	does	not	have	any	doubts?	He	points	out	that	many	religious	believers	do	not	always	have	unwavering	and	consistent	faith	in	what	they	believe,	quoting	William	James	as	saying	that	“faith	means	belief	in	something	concerning	which	doubt	is	still	theoretically	possible.”108	He	does	not	believe	that	religious	leaders	should	be	immune	from	fraud	convictions	in	every	case;	if	a	leader	solicited	funds	to	build	a	new	church	but	instead	used	that	money	to	go	on	a	lavish	vacation,	for	example,	that	would	be	unquestionably	illegal.	But	when	it	comes	to	false	representations	of	faith,	things	are	much	more	difficult.	As	Jackson	himself	put	it,	“When	does	less	than	full	belief	in	a	professes	credo	become	actionable	fraud	if	one	is	soliciting	gifts	or	legacies?”109		Just	two	decades	after	Ballard,	determinations	of	sincerity	would	be	put	to	a	significant	test	in	the	context	of	conscientious	objectors;	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	the	courts	were	very	much	involved	in	the	sincerity	testing	of	conscientious	objectors	to	the	draft,	and	in	many	ways	they	were	fairly	careful	and	consistent.110	Rather	than	looking	at	only	at	consistency	of	faith,	as	Jackson	feared,	draft	boards	were	to	take	into	consideration	any	combination	of	the	following	factors:	Consistency	of	belief,	delay	in	asserting	conscientious	objector	status,	objector’s	testimony	before	the	review	board,	religious	leader	testimony,	or	the	strength	of	the	registrant’s	statement	of	religious	belief.111	In	the	1965	case	United	
States	v.	Seeger,	for	example,	the	Supreme	Court	dealt	with	a	group	of	individuals	seeking	conscientious	objector	status,	and	in	it	the	Court	is	shown	to	take	into	consideration	a	number	of	factors,	saying	at	one	point	that	Seeger	was	shown	to	have	sincere	religious	
																																																								108	Ibid.	109	Ibid.	110	Noha	Moustafa,	“Note:	The	Right	to	Free	Exercise	of	Religion	in	Prisons:	How	Courts	 	Should	Determine	Sincerity	of	Religious	Belief	Under	RLUIPA,”	Michigan	Journal	of	Race	&	Law	20,	no	1	(2014),	9.	111	Ibid.,	9.	
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beliefs	due	to	the	following	reasons:	“He	was	a	product	of	a	devout	Roman	Catholic	home;	he	was	a	close	student	of	Quaker	beliefs	from	which	he	said	‘much	of	[his]	thought	is	derived’;	he	approved	of	their	opposition	to	war	in	any	form;	he	devoted	his	spare	hours	to	the	American	Friends	Service	Committee	and	was	assigned	to	hospital	duty.”112	Rather	than	questioning	whether	he	ever	lapsed	in	his	faith	(as	Justice	Jackson	feared	would	be	the	case	when	dealing	with	sincerity),	they	instead	chose	to	look	at	a	more	complete	picture	of	his	religious	life.	Though	the	draft	boards	in	general	seemed	to	avoid	some	of	the	potential	pitfalls	and	managed	to	set	up	a	system	that	seemed	at	least	fair	in	theory	(whether	every	draft	board	actually	reliably	implemented	this	system	is	another	question	entirely),	Jackson	was	right	to	worry	that	determining	religious	sincerity	would	often	prove	to	be	problematic,	and	one	of	the	most	prominent	examples	of	how	determining	sincerity	can	go	very	wrong	comes	from	a	somewhat	different	context:	prisons.		 When	the	Religious	Land	Use	and	Institutionalized	Persons	Act	passed	though	Congress,	it	essentially	revived	RFRA	at	the	state	level,	but	it	had	a	limited	application;	specifically,	it	would	apply	to	land	use	and	prisons.	In	relation	to	prison	policy,	RLUIPA	states	that	“no	government	shall	impose	a	substantial	burden	on	the	religious	exercise	of	a	person	residing	in	or	confined	to	an	institution…	even	if	the	burden	results	from	a	rule	of	general	applicability,	unless	the	government	demonstrated	that	imposition	of	the	burden	on	that	person	(1)	is	in	furtherance	of	a	compelling	government	interest;	and	(2)	is	the	least	restrictive	means	of	furthering	that	compelling	interest.”113	In	RLUIPA,	Congress	also	defined	“religious	exercise”	as	“any	exercise	of	religion	whether	or	not	compelled	by,	or	
																																																								112	United	States	v.	Seeger,	380	U.S.	163	(1965)	113	Moustafa,	3.	
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central	to,	a	system	of	religious	belief.”114	The	question	of	centrality	had,	before	RLUIPA,	been	one	of	the	key	factors	in	determining	the	degree	of	burden	placed	on	a	prisoner,	and	thus	the	major	factor	in	determining	whether	a	prisoner	would	qualify	for	exemption.	After	RLUIPA	made	it	significantly	easier	for	prisoners	to	get	religious	accommodation,	virtually	the	only	factor	that	prisons	could	examine	was	sincerity,	and	thus	many	prisons	resorted	to	sincerity	tests,	with	varying	degrees	of	success.115		 In	prisons,	religious	accommodations	are	often	very	desirable,	meaning	there	is	a	significant	incentive	for	inmates	to	lie	about	their	religious	beliefs;	they	can	allow	access	to	better	food,	more	time	outside	of	cells	or	congregating	with	fellow	inmates,	and	other	privileges	not	typically	offered	to	prisoners.116	While	sincerity	testing	would	ideally	ensure	that	only	those	with	genuine	religious	beliefs	received	the	appropriate	accommodations,	in	practice	there	have	been	many	difficulties	in	developing	an	efficient	way	to	determine	sincerity.	Because	neither	Congress	nor	the	courts	have	set	standards	for	determining	sincerity,	prison	officials	have	been	left	to	figure	out	a	solution	without	any	guidance,	and	the	systems	established	have	been	inconsistent	and	often	problematic.117		 One	of	the	most	crucial	issues	echoes	Jackson’s	concerns,	which	is	that	prisons	often	require	perfect	adherence	to	religious	beliefs	in	order	to	qualify	for	an	exemption.	For	example,	a	Jewish	prisoner	may	request	kosher	meals,	but	if	he	lapses	and	purchases	non-kosher	food	from	the	commissary,	his	accommodation	could	be	revoked.118	When	using	lapsing	behavior	as	a	guide,	it	is	not	always	possible	to	tell	whether	that	lapse	is	a	result	of	
																																																								114	Ibid.,	4.	115	Ibid.,	4.	116	Ibid.,	5.	117	Ibid.,	6.	118	Ibid.,	6.	
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dishonesty	or	whether	the	individual	is	a	sincere	believer	who	simply	did	not	maintain	perfect	adherence.	In	addition,	in	many	prisons,	sincerity	is	determined	by	having	chaplains	monitor	the	inmate’s	behavior	to	see	whether	they	are	consistently	adhering	to	their	professed	religion.	Prisons	often	do	not	have	chaplains	for	every	religion,	however,	resulting	in	sincerity	tests	often	being	conducted	by	individuals	who	belong	to	different	sects	or	faiths,	adding	even	more	difficulty	to	an	already	trying	task.119		Prisons	have	also	used	a	number	of	other	methods	for	determining	sincerity,	such	as	the	possession	of	physical	articles	of	faith.	When	Red	Onion	State	Prison	in	Virginia,	for	example,	originally	introduced	their	Ramadan	meals	program	(which	allowed	Muslim	inmates	to	receive	special	meals	before	and	after	sunset),	they	simply	allowed	any	inmate	to	sign	up.	When	that	resulted	in	nearly	half	the	prison	population	signing	up,	however,	they	decided	to	devise	a	sincerity	test	to	reduce	the	number	of	inmates	in	the	program	after	realizing	that	many	of	those	who	had	signed	up	were	not	in	fact	practicing	Muslims.	In	order	to	qualify	to	participate	in	the	Ramadan	meals	program,	an	inmate	would	be	required	to	possess	a	prayer	rug,	Quran,	or	some	other	physical	indication	of	faith,	as	if	it	is	possession	of	these	objects	that	makes	an	individual	a	true	Muslim.	Though	this	policy	was	eventually	struck	down	in	court,	it	is	an	example	of	how	difficult	it	can	be	to	find	a	way	to	fairly	determine	sincerity.120	It	is	conceivable	that	prisons	could	adapt	an	approach	more	similar	to	that	of	the	draft	boards	and	take	a	more	holistic	approach	to	sincerity	testing,	and	that	this	would	allow	them	to	create	a	system	that	was	much	more	fair.	But	whether	a	system	like	this	could	ever	be	applied	on	a	scale	large	enough	to	address	vaccination	exemptions	is																																																									119	Ibid.,	6-7.	120	Ibid.,	7.	
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somewhat	doubtful;	how	could	officials	realistically	examine	in	a	meaningful	way	the	life	of	every	person	in	the	country	who	wanted	a	religious	exemption?	Would	officials	be	required	to	comb	through	the	religious	history	of	every	individual	to	try	and	find	inconsistency	of	faith?	What	level	of	inconsistency	amounts	to	insincerity?	And	would	the	officials	involved	in	determining	sincerity	have	any	amount	of	expertise	in	the	faiths	that	they	would	be	examining?	Even	if	one	were	to	only	require	sincerity	testing	for	exemptions	where	fraud	was	highly	likely,	such	as	vaccination	exemptions,	it	is	still	difficult	to	imagine	a	system	that	could	be	thorough	enough	to	amount	to	an	accurate	assessment,	but	also	be	practical	in	terms	of	time	and	cost.	And	with	something	as	pressing	as	the	issue	of	vaccination,	in	which	many	individuals	are	seeking	exemptions	from	something	that	is	otherwise	compulsory,	a	practical	solution	is	essential.	 	Conclusion	Taking	all	these	factors	into	consideration,	it	becomes	difficult	to	justify	the	continued	existence	of	vaccination	exemptions,	even	when	considering	the	benefit	they	give	to	individuals	whose	religious	beliefs	forbid	vaccination.	In	trying	to	determine	whether	an	individual	seeking	exemption	is	sincere	in	their	beliefs,	and	whether	those	beliefs	are	indeed	grounded	in	religion,	there	is	considerable	room	for	both	error	and	discrimination.	When	a	relaxed	exemption	system	means	putting	public	health	at	risk,	and	a	restrictive	system	means	addressing	issues	that	the	courts	are	unprepared	to	answer	effectively,	the	only	reasonable	conclusion	is	to	eliminate	nonmedical	exemptions	for	vaccinations,	just	as	three	states	have	already	done.	
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However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	conclusions	drawn	about	vaccination	exemptions	do	not	apply	to	every	form	of	exemption,	and	they	do	not	even	necessarily	apply	to	all	exemptions	that	have	the	potential	to	harm	others.	As	discussed	throughout	this	essay,	all	kinds	of	exemption	have	different	considerations	to	be	taken	into	account,	and	it	is	entirely	possible	that	other	exemptions	could	have	perfectly	reasonable	systems	of	determining	eligibility.	For	example,	not	all	exemptions	require	the	courts	to	engage	with	the	question	of	sincerity,	because	not	all	exemptions	are	appealing	to	the	general	population.	Beyond	discussing	the	issues	with	vaccination	exemptions	specifically,	this	case	study	shows	how	different	exemptions	really	do	need	to	be	addressed	in	different	ways;	vaccination	exemptions	should	not	be	treated	in	the	same	way	as	exemptions	for	peyote	use,	and	peyote	exemptions	should	not	be	treated	in	the	same	way	that	zoning	law	exemptions	should	be	treated.	In	order	to	go	about	bringing	some	order	to	the	chaos	of	exemption	law	in	the	United	States,	it	is	essential	to	begin	by	addressing	problems	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	rather	than	assuming	that	it	is	possible	to	come	to	one	universally	applicable	answer.									
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